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Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command 
or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that 
this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean 
allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional 
attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be 
self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self-
defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus 
insightfully recognised, there is a strong connection between 
conduct and belief—and so between the content of free will 
scepticism (since it is about conduct) and the attitude of believing it. 
Second, we must realise that an attitude can be self-
defeating relative to certain grounds. This means that it might be 
self-defeating to be a free will sceptic on certain grounds, such as 
the putative fact that we lack leeway or sourcehood. This charge is 
much more interesting because of the epistemic importance of leeway 
and sourcehood. Ultimately, the Epicurean charge of self-defeat 
fails. Yet, it delivers important lessons to the sceptic. The most 
important of them is that free will sceptics should either accept the 
existence of leeway or reject the principle that ‘“ought” implies 
“can”’. 
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Free will scepticism is the doctrine that we do not have free will, i.e. the 
kind of command or control of our own conduct that we would need in 
order to be morally responsible for it.1 The concept of free will allows for 
different more precise conceptions. It is sometimes understood as the 
ability to choose amongst real alternatives or, as philosophers say, leeway;2 and 
it is sometimes understood as being the source of one’s conduct.3 Thus, 
sceptical arguments typically conclude that free will does not exist, on the 
grounds that we lack leeway or that we are not the source of our actions.  
 
Denying the existence of free will broadly defined might seem unthinkable 
to us. Radical as it stands, free will scepticism must be wrong.4 But if it is 
so radical, could it be turned against itself like some other sweeping 
philosophical doctrines? Several philosophers in history took up this 
challenge.5 Their arguments do not share a common philosophical lexicon. 
Nor do they always target free will scepticism explicitly—they often target 
determinism. But if they are sound, it is self-defeating to believe in free 
will scepticism, whether it is true or false. Since Epicurus first marshalled 
these arguments, let us call them ‘Epicurean arguments.’ 
 
This paper is slightly unusual in that it does not belong to a contained 
contemporary debate where it could make a very specific contribution. 
Few philosophers after the 70s took Epicurean arguments seriously. Those 
who did proposed complex reconstructions which relied on a vast array of 
controversial views about epistemology and free will.6 Going back to the 
simple argument of Epicurus, distilling its general idea, and using it to 
regiment refined but simple Epicurean arguments is my first goal. My 
second goal is to assess how the sceptic might respond to each type of 
argument and to unearth what she might already learn. I ask the reader to 
judge this critical engagement as it is: a precocious step in a nascent 
literature.  
 
Here is the game plan to meet my two goals. I start with Epicurus’ 
own argument (§2) and discuss what it means to be self-defeating. I then 
move to reconstructing the argument in the most charitable way (§3). This 
 
1 See e.g. Strawson (1994), Waller (2011), and Pereboom (2001; 2014a). 
2 See e.g. Vihvelin (2013) and van Inwagen (2017). 
3 See e.g. Frankfurt (1971) and Fischer (1994). 
4  For a recent discussion of the parallels between a dogmatic response to free will 
scepticism and to scepticism, see Chevarie-Cossette (forthcoming). 
5 See e.g. Hinman (1979), Dworkin (2011), Slagle (2016), and Lockie (2018). 
6 See e.g. Lockie (2018) and Slagle (2016). 
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gives rise to arguments related to sourcehood (§4) and leeway (§5), which 
I examine in turn. 
 
 
2. Epicurus’ Argument 
 
About the view that all comes to pass by necessity, Epicurus argued:  
 
This sort of account (λόγος) is self-refuting (τρέπω περικάτω), 
and can never prove that everything is of the kind called 
‘necessitated’; but he [the sceptic or the determinist] debates 
this very question on the assumption that his opponent is 
himself responsible (δι ἑαυτοῦ) for talking nonsense. (Epicurus, On 
Nature. XXV, 34; translation Annas, Taylor, and Sedley 
1983, 19–23)  
 
To extract the best possible argument from this passage, we need to answer 
two questions. First, who does the Epicurean criticise: the determinist or 
the free will sceptic? Second, what does the Epicurean criticise this target 
for: making a discourse, maintaining a belief, or posing an action? For 
simplicity, call these two things respectively the target and the object of 
the Epicurean arguments. 
  
2.1. The Target and Object of Epicurus’ Argument 
 
The official target of Epicurus is the Stoic who endorses the doctrine of 
necessity. This doctrine approximates physical determinism, the thesis that 
the conjunction of all the physical states in a given time slice and the laws 
of nature determines the states in any other time slice. However, Epicurus’ 
argument is mostly worrying to determinists who also believe that 
determinism undermines free will, namely hard determinists—as opposed 
to determinists who do not, namely soft determinists.  
 
Why? Epicurus’ argument, as we will soon discover, turns on the claim 
that rationality or reason requires free will (whether sourcehood or 
leeway). The soft determinist may simply respond to Epicurus that the 
apparent, though illusory, difficulty of reconciling determinism with 
rationality is entirely inherited from the apparent, though illusory, 
opposition between determinism and free will. But this response is 
unavailable to the hard determinist. The hard determinist must be 
an incompatibilist between determinism and free will but a compatibilist between 
determinism and rationality. This is the real challenge. So, there is no 
doubt that, if Epicurean arguments work, they work against hard 
determinists. The most charitable reconstruction of Epicurean arguments 
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thus reads them as primarily targeting hard determinists.7 To simplify, I 
will consider that the target of Epicurus extends to all free will sceptics. 
For one thing, sceptics typically admit the possibility of determinism; for 
another, Epicurus’ argument hinges on the alleged consequences of 
determinism for free will (or responsibility), not on determinism itself.  
 
Moving to the object of the argument. In the passage, Epicurus focusses 
on the sceptic’s logos (λόγος). But logos is famously ambiguous and 
suggests at least two possible translations. It could mean ‘account’, i.e. the 
sceptic’s doctrine; or it could mean ‘reasoning’, i.e. the sceptic’s inference or belief 
from reasons. What is wrong with this account or with this reasoning? 
They are described as trepetai egkalein (‘τρέπω περικάτω’), a technical 
term which literally translates as defeating upside down. Translators talk 
about ‘self-refutation’ or ‘self-defeat’, but what does that mean?  
 
2.2. Self-Defeat and Self-Refutation  
 
To understand Epicurus’ argument, we must distinguish self-refutation 
from self-defeat and their respective objects. 8  A proposition (or an 
account) is self-refuting, in one common sense of the term, just when it is 
contradictory because it applies or refers to itself; for instance, ‘No 
universal proposition is true’. Similarly, an argument is self-refuting 
just when it is unsound because it applies or refers to itself; for instance, 
‘single-premise arguments are invalid; therefore, single-premise arguments are 
invalid’.9  
 
Free will scepticism is not self-refuting in this sense, since it is neither 
contradictory nor self-referential. The arguments supporting free will 
scepticism are not self-refuting either: while they might be unsound, this 
is not because they apply or refer to themselves. This suggests that when 
Epicurus attacks the sceptic’s logos, he does not mean her ‘account’.   
 
However, there might be epistemic problems with believing or reasoning (in the 
sense of reasoning to a conclusion) that free will scepticism is true. After 
all, this is what Epicurus’ argument suggests: that the content of a 
doctrine interacts with the epistemic attitudes of its proponent in an 
unfortunate way.  
 
This is where the notion of self-defeat is relevant; for its object is precisely 
attitudes like beliefs or inferences rather than abstracta like propositions or 
 
7 Cf. Slagle (2016, 17, 28, 201–202) and Lockie (2018). 
8 In this, I follow Slagle’s distinction (2016, 41–43). 
9 This conforms to Mackie’s account (1964); see also Page (1992, 423). 
Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating? 
 59 
accounts. There are two kinds of case of self-defeating propositional 
attitudes like belief. First, imagine Tommy, an undergraduate philosophy 
student who, fortunately for our purpose and unfortunately for his peers, 
likes to embrace the most radical theses he encounters. Today he believes 
that he has no beliefs. The fact that he believes this proposition 
ensures10 that it is false. Tommy’s belief is ‘self’-defeating in the sense that 
the believing (the attitude) defeats what is believed (the content)—see Act 
defeats content below. Second, imagine that Tommy acquires the belief 
that he would not acquire a single justified belief that day. Even assuming 
that this is true, Tommy’s belief is self-defeating. The presumed truth of 
Tommy’s belief ensures that he believes it inadequately, e.g. without 
justification, irrationally, unreasonably, etc. Tommy’s belief is ‘self’-
defeating in the sense that the truth of what is believed (the content) 
precludes the believing (the attitude) from being adequate—see Content 
defeats act below.  
 
Thus, self-defeat is a property which, when it applies to beliefs, plays on 
an act/object ambiguity. It is either the attitude of believing which ensures 
that the belief content is false or, alternatively, it is the alleged truth of 
the belief content which ensures that the attitude of believing is inadequate. In light 
of this, it is no surprise that the object of Epicurus’ argument was uneasy to 
identify.  
 
A last remark: a belief is based on some grounds and those grounds are 
sometimes relevant to whether it is self-defeating. Last week, Tommy 
came to think that he was hopeless at remembering events in the distant 
past. That’s fine. But Tommy formed his belief on the grounds that, when 
he was eight, he forgot his best friend’s name four times. Now, this is 
problematic. Tommy’s belief could well be true; and this time, it could be 
adequate if it was differently grounded. But the presumed truth of the belief 
content ensures that the believing is inadequate, grounded as it is. Thus, 
whether a belief is self-defeating is relative to the grounds on which it is 
believed.11 
   




10 One might read ‘ensures that’ as ‘is a sufficient reason for’, ‘explains why’, ‘grounds’, 
or ‘makes’. 
11 Some might think that this remark stretches the notion of self-defeat since the grounds of 
a belief is something external to it and so cannot contribute to self-defeat. Yet what a belief 
contains is contentious: a belief in the same proposition but which has been rebased on 
other grounds is not obviously the same belief. When I say that a belief is self-defeating, I 
use this broader view of what a belief contains. 
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Self-defeating beliefs =df Suppose that a subject S believes 
that p on the grounds that q. Then, S’s believing that p is self-
defeating if and only if either:  
(Act defeats content) The fact that S believes that p on the 
grounds that q ensures that p is false; or,  
(Content defeats act) The presumed truth of p ensures 
that S believes that p on the grounds that q inadequately.12  
 
What is an adequate belief? For the purpose of this discussion, I will 
assume that it is a belief which is rational or reasonable. For our purpose, I 
find it useful to understand rationality in believing as believing according 
to some rules of rationality and reasonableness in believing as believing on 
good grounds or for good reasons.  
 
I also think that self-defeating beliefs are beliefs that we should dispose of, 
at least upon recognising that they are such. This is because they are beliefs 
which generally fail to be reasonable. Typically, a self-defeating belief is 
unreasonable in that it implies that it is unsupported by reasons: so either 
it is false or unsupported by reasons.  Upon discovering this fact, we lose 
any reason to maintain this belief (see Chevarie-Cossette 2019).13  
 
 
3. Reconstructing the Epicurean Argument 
 
We now have some tools to provide a charitable interpretation of Epicurus’ 
claim. 14  Free will scepticism is not self-refuting, for there is nothing 
contradictory or self-referential about the thesis that free will does not 
exist. However, free will scepticism is a thesis that concerns conduct, but 
which extends to attitudes. The suggestion is that there is an unfortunate 
interaction between the content of the thesis of free will scepticism and the 
attitude of believing or inferring. This is crucial: a key to all Epicurean 
arguments is a connection between conduct and beliefs. 
 
So, free will scepticism might be self-defeating to believe in. But if this is 
true, this cannot be in virtue of the fact that to believe it makes it false (as 
in Act Defeats Content). What remains is the possibility that the presumed 
 
12 I have presented this account elsewhere (Chevarie-Cossette 2019). 
13 We should note however that some philosophers still insist that they can reasonably 
question the existence of reasons (Olson 2014, chap. 9; cf. Cuneo 2007, chap. 4). The 
question turns essentially on whether reasons are inherently normative and on whether we 
can, in distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable beliefs, use a non-normative notion 
like evidence. 
14 There is also a plausible moral interpretation of Epicurus’ argument, but I leave it aside 
for our purpose.  
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truth of free will scepticism (perhaps combined with something else) 
ensures that one does not rationally or reasonably believe it (Content 
Defeats Act). Why would this be true? The most straightforward 
explanation is that rationality or reasonableness requires free will.15 
 
This explanation sits well with another remark of Epicurus on the topic: 
 
The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity 
cannot criticise (ἐγκαλέω) one who denies that all things 
come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens 
of necessity. (Epicurus, Extant Remains, Frag. XL; translation 
Bailey 1926, 112) 
 
According to this point, the sceptic cannot legitimately criticise her 
opponent. This is because in trying to persuade her opponent, the sceptic 
is appealing to her opponent’s rationality; but, again, rationality implies 
free will.16 So, in order to convince someone of a doctrine, the free wil 
sceptic must presume its falsehood. 
 
We need not focus on this dialectical problem. If it is self-defeating to 
rationally persuade someone to be a sceptic, it has everything to do with 
the rational character of persuasion and nothing to do with its 
interpersonal character (cf. Castagnoli 2007, 16). So we should ask again: 
is it true that rationality or reason implies free will? 
 
It seems, after all, that I can rationally believe that 2+2=4 without having 
free will, i.e. the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. 
Here are two pro tanto reasons to strengthen this impression. First, there 
seems to be no necessary opposition between rational belief and 
constrained belief. Quite the opposite, constraint seems like a part of 
rationality, as Nozick (1981, 4–8) and James noted (1912, 168–169): to 
give in to forceful or knockdown arguments, or to be forced to a conclusion, 
is not irrational at all. Second, there seems to be no necessary opposition 
between rational action and unfree action (in the sense of an inner 
freedom). A heroin addict in rehabilitation acts rationally in taking the safe 
dose given by a doctor, regardless of whether he has the command or 
control to refuse to take it. If there is no opposition between rationality on 
the one hand and coercion or absence of inner freedom on the other hand, 
 
15 By ‘free will’, it is important to insist that I mean nothing more than the command or 
control necessary for moral responsibility. Otherwise, this would be an anachronistic 
interpretation of Epicurus. See Bobzien (2000) and Frede (2011).  
16 Again, there is also a moral interpretation of this argument according to which it is unfair 
to criticise someone for not being a free will sceptic. 
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it is unclear that there is an opposition between rationality and absence of 
free will. 
 
We can however refine our explanation of why it is self-defeating to 
believe in free will scepticism. Epicurus targeted the free will sceptic’s 
logos or reasoning. But we reason from premises and we believe on certain 
grounds. Now, the grounds or premises for which one is a free will sceptic 
includes or implies the proposition that humans lack leeway or sourcehood. 
The Epicurean can take advantage of these points. She does not need to 
argue that the existence of rationality or reason implies the existence of 
free will, understood generally. She can instead argue more narrowly that 
either leeway or sourcehood implies rationally. Thus, believing in free will 




4. Sourcehood  
 
Epicurus himself was a sort of sourcehood theorist. In fact, he claimed that 
the sceptic debates the question of responsibility ‘on the assumption that 
his opponent is himself responsible (δι ἑαυτοῦ) for talking nonsense.’ The 
Greek for ‘responsible’ is δι ἑαυτοῦ (di eautou), which means ‘because of 
himself’—as opposed to because of something external (see Bobzien 2000, 
291–292). This is sourcehood. So, according to Epicurus the sceptic cannot 
argue that we are never the source of our conduct because this presumes 
that she is not the source of her reasoning or belief. This is supposed to be 
self-defeating. 
 
What is it to be the source of one’s conduct? The contemporary literature 
gives us two main answers. We are the source of our conduct when our 
actions and omissions stem from reason-responsive mechanisms (see e.g. 
Fischer 1994; Hurley 2003; Sartorio 2016). Alternatively, we are the 
source of our conduct when our actions and omissions are the product of 
some of our desires or our values—something to which we identify or 
which belongs to our ‘real selves’ (see, e.g., Frankfurt 1971; Shoemaker 
2015). So, the first view emphasises reason while the second emphasises 
identification or ownership.17 
 
There is a sceptical concern corresponding roughly to each answer. The 
first is that reasons are irrelevant to the explanation of our conduct: our 
conduct, including our reasons for action, can be entirely accounted for in 
 
17 These answers are not exclusive: for instance, Fischer endorses an endorsement condition 
on responsibility. 
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terms of physical events. Call this the exclusion concern. The second 
concern is that our conduct does not ultimately belong to our real selves—
or if it does, this is partly insignificant—because our conduct is ultimately 
determined by events outside of our control. The same goes for reasons for 
which we act. Call this the ownership concern. The two concerns are 
importantly linked: the exclusion concern makes the radical claim that we 
never act for reasons; the ownership concern leads to the less radical view 
that we never act for reasons that are ultimately ours. In a word, the first 
concern casts doubt on reason for conduct; the second on ownership of 




The exclusion concern about reasons stems from so-called exclusion 
arguments about mental states (see, e.g., Kim 2007). Roughly, mental 
states seem to be unidentical to physical states and yet realised in them. 
But then the cause of our conduct could be entirely accounted for in terms 
of physical states. This leaves no causal role to be played by our mental 
states. The conclusion is not that mental states do not exist, but rather that 
we have no reason to think that they have a causal effect.  
 
The same argument applies more specifically to our reasons. For the 
purpose of this discussion, I understand reasons as facts which explain or 
favour other facts (or which explain both normative and non-normative 
facts). And I understand our reasons as pieces of knowledge or justified 
beliefs in these reasons. When S acts for reason R, S acts because S knows 
R or because S is justified in believing R. I make these plausible18 assumptions 
for simplicity’s sake. On this picture, if mental states have no causal role, 
nobody acts for a reason. It vindicates free will scepticism. 
 
The worry is that if our reasons have no causal role on our conduct, the 
same applies for our beliefs, including our belief in free will scepticism. 
This Epicurean response was most famously made by Karl Popper (and 
has not been much discussed in the recent literature): 
 
[P]hysical determinism is a theory which, if it is true, is not 
arguable, since it must explain all our reactions, including 
what appears to us as beliefs based on arguments, as due to 
purely physical conditions […]. But this means that if we 
believe that we have accepted a theory like determinism 
because we were swayed by the logical force of certain 
arguments, then we are deceiving ourselves, according to 
 
18 See Hyman (2015) and Alvarez (2017). 
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physical determinism […]. (Popper 1972, 223–224, emphasis 
is mine; see also Lockie 2018, chap. 10) 
 
Thus, it is self-defeating to believe in free will scepticism because if it were 
true, it would follow that we do not believe it for a reason, since we believe 
only because of natural events. (Popper’s use of ‘purely’ is supposed to 
mark an exclusion.) 
 
Popper was right to maintain this connection between actions and beliefs. 
If we never act for reasons, we never believe for reasons. If my giving to 
charity being caused by a natural event is incompatible with (or if it 
excludes) my giving to charity for a moral reason, then my believing that I 
should give to charity being caused by a natural event is incompatible with 
(or it excludes) my believing it for a moral reason. For, in general, what 
counts as a reason to act can also count as a reason to believe. The fact that 
wealth is unequally distributed in our society is both a reason to give to 
charity and to believe that we should do so. And once we know that wealth 
is unequally distributed, then it becomes our reason to act and believe. 
What counts as a cause for a belief can also count as a cause for an action. 
The Wall Street Crash of 1929 caused many people to believe that they had 
lost their fortune; and it caused Roosevelt to propose his New Deal. And 
what counts as acting or believing for a reason must include some sort of 
causal connection between an agent’s holding to that reason and her action 
or belief. 
 
This clear but admittedly controversial picture leaves no room for an 
asymmetry that the free will sceptic could exploit in responding to the 
Epicurean. This suggests that the Epicurean has a sound argument: 
  
The Reason Argument 
 
If everyone acts because of natural events rather than for reasons, 
everyone believes because of natural events rather than for 
reasons. 
If everyone believes because of natural events rather than for 
reasons, no one believes rationally. 
Therefore, if everyone acts because of natural events rather than 
for reasons, no one believes rationally that free will scepticism is 
true. 
 
I have just discussed the first premise, which is the typically Epicurean 
premise that connects conduct and beliefs. And the second rests on a 
natural connection between rationality and reasons and on the fact that by 
‘rather’, I signal an incompatibility. As I indicated, it follows that believing 
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in free will scepticism on a certain ground is self-defeating, the ground 
being that we act because of natural events rather than for reasons. This is 
all I need to show for my purpose:  
  
First lesson: The free will sceptic cannot and should not rely on 
the doubtful claim that we act because of natural events rather than 
for reasons. 
 
So free will sceptics should try, as we all should, to find a way out of the 
exclusion concern.  
 
Since the problem is general and applies to all mental states, the free will 
sceptic will not be able to solve it by drawing distinctions between different 
kinds of explanations or reasons. True, she can insist—as did Ayer (1963, 
266–267) and Wolf (1993, 72)—that something can be both caused and 
justified. If I ask you ‘why do you believe that Italian is the most beautiful 
language?’, you may both respond that it is because you spent some time 
in Italy (which merely explains your belief) or that it is more colourful than 
any other language (which justifies your belief). But this does not help to 
deal with the exclusion concern. This is because action or belief for a 
reason (because I am justified) must make room for the causal role of 





We now move to the second sceptical concern and its corresponding 
Epicurean argument. The concern is that even if we act for reasons (contra 
the exclusion concern), these reasons—and so our actions—are not truly 
ours since they can all be ultimately explained by facts or events foreign 
to us. Alternatively, even if some reasons (or desires and values) were ours, 
this would not mean much since our having these reasons would not 
ultimately be up to us (see Strawson 1994; Pereboom 2014a).  
 
The Epicurean can respond to this challenge, again by connecting actions 
and beliefs. If our actions and our reasons for action are foreign to us, so 
are our beliefs. But then our beliefs do not stem from our reasons and 





19 See Kant (Groundworks 4: 448) for the claim that foreign influence is incompatible with 
the work of reason. 
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The Sourcehood Argument 
 
If no one is the adequate source of their conduct, no one is the 
adequate source of their beliefs. 
If no one is the adequate source of their beliefs, no one believes 
rationally. 
Therefore, if no one is the adequate source of their conduct, no one 
believes rationally that free will scepticism is true. 
 
The first premise is the typically Epicurean connection between conduct 
and beliefs. I shall argue that although the Epicurean is right to connect 
beliefs and actions in this way, she is wrong to think that moral free will 
(or responsibility) and rationality each requires sourcehood in the same 
sense. In a word, the Sourcehood Argument equivocates. 
 
To be the adequate source of her conduct in the sense relevant to 
responsibility and free will, a subject must first be the source of her 
conduct. Her conduct must stem from her. Thus, it cannot be the direct 
result of an external factor such as someone pushing her. Nor can it be the 
direct result of an internal factor which is not the agent’s, such as an 
uncontrollable impulse or a disease. For a similar reason, someone who 
acts under duress is not the adequate source of her action: this action does 
not really stem from her in the relevant sense. It somehow is the action of 
the coercer (Nozick 1997, 38).  
 
But this is not enough. A child soldier who participates willingly in an act 
of war is still not the adequate source of his conduct. He did not make 
himself; and the commitments that he manifests in his violent behaviour 
are not fundamentally his. Some sceptics suggest that this is because the 
child is not the source of the source of his conduct (see Strawson 1994; 
Pereboom 2014a). To use Hurley’s phrase (2003), the free will sceptic (and 
some incompatibilists) requires that to be responsible for Φ, someone be 
responsible for the causes of Φ. Now, to be responsible for Φ or to be the 
source of Φ, a subject does not need to be responsible for or be the source 
of everything that leads to Φ. The subject must be responsible for or be the 
source of what determines that she will Φ (see Istvan 2011). This still leads 
to a regress, unless the causal chain can stop in the agent’s free act of will—
which the sceptic denies. The subject’s conduct is ultimately determined 
by something that she is not the source of—and so for which she is not 
responsible. The subject will never be the ultimate source of her conduct—
she will never be truly responsible.20 
 
 
20 For a similar reasoning, see Galen Strawson (1994) and Istvan (2011). 
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Free will sceptics can say the very same thing about beliefs: to be the 
adequate source of them, we need to be the adequate source of their cause. 
But it leads again to a regression: for the causal chain continues up until a 
point where we no longer are the adequate source of the thing we are 
considering. Since this reasoning is just as plausible—no more, no less—
for beliefs and for conduct, the first premise looks true: if no one is the 
adequate source of their conduct, no one is the adequate source of their 
beliefs. 
 
Now, the second premise also seems true. Believing for good reasons or 
on adequate evidence is generally insufficient to believe rationally. For 
this, a subject must usually believe for good reasons that are her own—on 
her evidence. If Detective Chief Inspector Japp does not believe that there 
is an earring in the room, then it would be irrational at best of him to believe 
that the killer is a woman on the grounds that there is an earring in the 
room. Japp clearly needs to acquire the evidence or the reason—that he 
makes it his—and this in turn implies that he forms the relevant belief or 
that he comes to know the relevant fact. 
 
For this, one might think, Japp needs again to believe on his evidence or 
for his reasons. And this might look like it causes a regress which shows 
that rationality, just like responsibility, is impossible. Yet this is mistaken. 
The fact that, to believe rationally, Japp needs to believe for his reasons 
does not imply that the reasons for which he believes must have been 
acquired because of a further reason that was his own. Why? There are two 
classic answers to this. The foundationalist (most notably Aristotle) claims 
that there might be self-evident reasons or special pieces of evidence that 
Japp acquires simply by paying attention to them. The existence of these 
things clearly has nothing to do with free will or determinism. The 
coherentist (such as Blanshard) claims that a series of belief can justify 
each other in a circle. Again, whether someone holds coherent beliefs has 
nothing to do with free will and determinism. The foundationalist can 
claim that while a responsible action requires a further responsible action 
ad infinitum, it is clear that a justified belief does not require a further 
justified belief ad infinitum. And a coherentist can claim that while 
justification can stem from the coherence of a set of beliefs, responsibility 
cannot stem from the coherence of a set of actions.  
 
This means that, whether coherentist or foundationalist in nature, the 
structure of justification differs from the structure of responsibility. What 
is required for justification differs fundamentally from what is required for 
free will. Only the former can plausibly give rise to an infinite regression. 
We saw that there is a sense in which the concept of ‘adequate sourcehood’ 
is fitting in both the case of responsibility and of justification since each 
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implies a kind of ownership. But since the structure of justification is so 
different from the structure of responsibility, this strongly suggests that 
‘sourcehood’ does not refer to the same property in each case or that the 
standards of adequacy differ fundamentally from premise 1 to premise 2.  
 
The sceptic can therefore insist that the Sourcehood Argument equivocates: 
rationality requires sourcehood or adequacy in a different sense than moral 
responsibility (according to the sceptic). It is not, then, that ‘adequate 
sourcehood’ always means something different when it applies to actions 
and when it applies to beliefs. The Epicurean is right to maintain a 
symmetry between these things. Rather, ‘adequate sourcehood’ is different 
whether we are talking about what is necessary for moral responsibility 
and whether we are talking about what is necessary for rationality. 
 
Despite having refuted the Sourcehood Argument, the free will sceptic has 
a concession to make. She must concede that when some compatibilist 
argues that we have free will because, roughly, we act for our own reasons, 
he is partly right. We do act for our own reasons, in the same sense that we 
believe for our own reasons. But this sourcehood, the sceptic must then 
argue, is different from the sourcehood necessary for moral responsibility. 
In a word: 
 
Second lesson: The free will sceptic must recognise the existence 
of some property of sourcehood, one that is necessary for people 
to believe and act for their own reasons and rationally. 
 
The Sourcehood Argument fails but it urges the sceptic to explain why 






As I indicated previously, some philosophers doubt the existence of free 
will on the grounds that we lack leeway. It suffices for our purpose to 
roughly indicate why. Typically, the leeway sceptic combines the 
Consequence Argument (see, e.g., van Inwagen 2017) and the Mind 
Argument (see, e.g., Pereboom 2014a). The Consequence Argument 
claims roughly that if determinism is true, then our actions are the 
consequence of the remote past and of the laws of nature. Thus, to act 
differently, we would need to change the laws of nature or the distant past, 
which is impossible. The Mind Argument says, crudely, that 
indeterminism is determinism plus chance, which is irrelevant to our 
abilities. Therefore, we lack the ability to do otherwise. 
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This suggests an Epicurean argument: 
 
If pessimistic determinism [free will scepticism] were true, no 
one could responsibly think that he had made a wise [or 
rational] decision in believing it. He had no choice but to 
believe it. (Dworkin 2011, 225, my emphasis) 
 
The notion of choice is obviously tied to that of alternatives: Dworkin is 
not merely talking about the mental event of choosing, but the selection of 
one amongst several courses of action. Dworkin tells us, without much 
argument, that wisdom requires leeway. 
 
A stronger philosophical treatment is given by Robert Lockie: 
 
[I]f determinism is true, then no-one can do otherwise and 
therefore no-one may reason otherwise. Assuming that the 
ability to reason otherwise is necessary for someone to be held 
epistemically irresponsible, no-one may then be held 
responsible for their intellectually wrong actions or 
unjustified, irrational cognition. But if no-one is responsible 
for their unjustified cognition, then no-one is epistemically 
justified either—in the intended, internalist sense. […] So one 
cannot be epistemically justified in claiming that determinism 
is true. (Lockie 2018, 183; my emphasis, premise numbering 
omitted)21 
 
I shall argue that there is a simplified and less ambitious version of 
Lockie’s argument. This argument does not suppose, controversially, that 
determinism is incompatible with leeway; it does not dip into the question 
of epistemic responsibilities; and it does not tackle the difficult topic of 
‘holding’ responsible. My argument simply captures Lockie’s insight that 
rationality (‘internalist justification’) requires leeway because leeway is 
required for obligations (responsibilities).  
 
That leeway implies rationality cannot be established directly: it is false 
that if one believes a proposition rationally, one could have believed 
otherwise. A subject could believe a proposition rationally in the absence 
of any kind of leeway. Thankfully, most of us would be incapable of 
 
21 In this chapter, Lockie discusses two related arguments, but they are of a different kind. 
The first (179) concludes that determinists cannot accept deontic ethics; the second (about 
the lazy argument, 178) fundamentally makes the claim that in deliberating we must 
presume that we have options.  
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disbelieving that 2+2=4 and yet nothing impedes (directly) the rationality 
of our belief that 2+2=4. We need an indirect argument. 
 
5.1. The Leeway Argument 
 
The Epicurean can pursue an indirect strategy and claim that if one 
irrationally believes a proposition, one could have believed otherwise. 
This principle is more plausible. For, suppose that a subject believes that 
2+2=5 and could not believe otherwise. Then, the Epicurean may still 
declare that this subject’s belief is not rational: it is perhaps arational, but 
not irrational. 
 
Why would the Epicurean say this? Irrationality, she can say, implies a 
failure to satisfy obligations to believe and if leeway does not exist, then 
these obligations do not exist either. Why does the inexistence of leeway 
imply the inexistence of obligations? The Epicurean says: first, if we can 
never do or believe otherwise, we never have the obligation to do or believe 
otherwise because ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (henceforth OIC). Second, if we 
never have the obligation to do or believe otherwise, we have no 
obligations at all: we want to leave aside the abstruse view that we only 
have the obligation to perform the acts that we in fact perform and to 
believe the propositions that we in fact believe (this only make sense for a 
saint).  
 
Once we have admitted that the inexistence of leeway implies the 
inexistence of irrationality, we should admit that it implies the inexistence 
of rationality in general. Rationality and irrationality go hand in hand. This 
explains why it is quite natural to think that animals and toddlers are 
arational rather than irrational. This does not have to mean that for one to 
rationally believe that 2+2=4 one is able to believe otherwise in this 
situation; it simply means that the existence of rationality in general 
implies the existence of irrationality in general.22 We can make sense of 
the philosophical view that rationality and irrationality do not exist: 
rationality would be a property without extension (perhaps because there 
are no norms of rationality) and irrationality would not exist because 
irrationality is absence of rationality where rationality could apply. 
Everything would be arational because arationality means the absence of 
rationality where rationality could not apply (e.g. the table is arational). 
But to make sense of the view that rationality exists, but not irrationality, 
we would need to imagine that if rationality can apply, then it exists. This 
only works in an ideal world, a place we do not live in. 
 
22 This argument might recall the theistic argument that the existence of evil implies the 
existence of the good. 
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It is now helpful to summarise the argument: 
 
The Leeway Argument 
If no one has leeway, there are no obligations. 
If there are no obligations, no one believes irrationally. 
If no one believes irrationally, no one believes rationally. 
Therefore, if no one has leeway, no one believes rationally that 
free will scepticism is true. 
 
Here again we have a typically Epicurean connection between conduct and 
beliefs in the two first premises (since ‘no one has leeway’ is at least partly 
about conduct). 
 
If the Leeway Argument is sound, it follows that it is self-defeating to 
believe that free will scepticism is true on the grounds that we have no 
leeway. The presumed truth of free will scepticism ensures that either it is 
believed on false grounds (since we have leeway) or that it is not believed 
rationally (since we have no leeway and thus cannot believe rationally). 
 
It is worth insisting at this point that, although the sceptic could admit the 
existence of leeway and find other grounds for her doctrine, this is a major 
consequence. As we just saw, some of the main arguments for free will 
scepticism feature leeway. And, although many sceptics23 and non-sceptics24 
are now sourcehood theorists, they often concede in passing that, in a 
sense, we lack leeway. If the Leeway Argument is sound, this is 
problematic; belief leeway needs to be maintained for rationality. 
 
This means that the sceptic should try to find a way to refute the Leeway 
Argument. I suggest that she abandons OIC, although this might be 
mistaken. Let me simply point out that OIC is popular amongst free will 
sceptics (see, e.g., Pereboom 2014b, 222; cf. Waller 2011). Some sceptics 
have appealed to it in defence of another principle that is sometimes used 
by free will sceptics, the principle that we are only responsible if we could 
have done otherwise.25 And if free will sceptics were to concede that we 
can do otherwise, it might be harder to argue that we are not ultimately the 
source of our actions. 
 
Instead of making this costly concession, the sceptic might want to follow 
a third way and declare that the Leeway Argument equivocates on the 
sense of ‘obligation’. There are two ways to argue for this. The first is to 
 
23 See Pereboom (1995, 27; 2014a, 138; 2014b, 221). 
24 This might include semi-compatibilists like Fischer (1994). 
25 On this, see e.g. Widerker (1991) and Copp (2008). 
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oppose obligations to believe and obligation to act and insist that the 
second but not the first requires leeway. The second is to oppose epistemic 
obligations and moral obligations and maintain that the second but not the 
first requires leeway. I consider each in the following subsections. 
 
5.2. Obligations to Believe, Obligations to Act 
 
We have some power over our conduct and so while it is controversial that 
an obligation to act implies ‘can’, it remains plausible. By contrast, 
obligations to believe, one might suggest, cannot imply ‘can’ because we 
have obligations to believe, but we do not control directly our beliefs.26 So, 
although we might have thought with the Epicurean that all obligations 
were similar in their requirements, this is incorrect: obligations to believe 
and to act are made of a different fabric. 
 
While tempting, this counterargument is unavailable to our sceptic (and so 
there is no need to consider whether we directly control our beliefs). This 
is simply because the sceptic who accepts that we lack leeway, following 
the same reasoning, would have to conclude that the moral ‘ought’ does 
not imply ‘can’ either, since she denies the existence of leeway in conduct. 
But then the strategy is no longer a third-way escape focussing on the 
asymmetry between two kinds of obligations to preserve OIC. It throws 
OIC under the bus. 
 
5.3. Epistemic Obligations, Moral Obligations 
 
The contrast between epistemic and moral obligations might look more 
promising. As Clifford insisted, there are moral obligations to act, but also 
to believe. Similarly, there are epistemic obligations to believe, but there 
might also be epistemic obligations to act. So the epistemic/moral 
distinction cuts across the to believe/to act distinction. If I must choose 
between happily believing against my evidence and depressingly believing 
on my evidence, it is possible that the two kinds of normativity pull me in 
different direction. We can see this if we consider a case where a doctor 
could gather more evidence for the efficacy of a new vaccine or spend this 
time to administer it to patients. The general idea is that there are two kinds 
of normativity which aim at two kinds of value and which are subject to 
different requirements. Perhaps the anti-Epicurean can use this picture. 
 
Her strategy would be to argue that moral, but not epistemic, obligations 
require alternatives. For this, the anti-Epicurean will try to show that 
epistemic normativity is like other ‘minor’ kinds of normativity. In fact, in 
 
26 This is precisely what Alston (1989) advocates. 
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general, certain kinds of obligations, like obligations of etiquette and 
professional obligations, do not imply ‘can.’ The Dean of the Faculty 
might have an obligation to attend a meeting even if he cannot be present—
he might have been in a car accident. He thus fails to satisfy an obligation, 
although he is excused. To be sure, his work-description does not specify 
that his obligations are suspended if he is unable to meet them, at least, not 
in all cases where he lacks the relevant abilities. Similarly, etiquette 
certainly recommends that a guest show appreciation for a meal, but this 
might be impossible if a food allergy forces her to rush to the bathroom. 
An obligation was infringed, despite the excuse. And the epistemic ‘ought’ 
might be very similar to etiquette and professional obligations as regards 
‘can’: “our friend in his tinfoil hat can’t make himself stop overtly 
believing contradictions” (Carr 2015, 752). But, surely, our friend in his 
tinfoil hat is not believing rationally and therefore he infringes an 
obligation of rationality. 
 
But then, can’t we say the same thing of moral obligations? There is an 
analogous character to our friend in his tinfoil hat—the inexorably evil man 
with his dictator cap. Surely, he infringes his moral obligations—and so 
the moral ‘ought’ does not imply the moral ‘can’. Remember however that 
the anti-Epicurean strategy here is to keep ‘“moral ought” implies “can”’ 
and reject ‘“epistemic ought” implies can’. So she must insist that 
somehow the dictator does not have the true moral obligation to refrain 
from ‘dictating.’ 
 
She can make the following case. True obligations imply can (perhaps 
because their infringement is blameworthy), and other obligations—such 
as professional obligations, chess obligations, and epistemic obligations—
are just rules that it would be ridiculous to insist ‘imply can’. What 
distinguishes our friend in his tinfoil hat from our foe in his dictator cap is 
that the first fails to follow epistemic rules whereas the second is not under 
moral obligations.27 Satisfying epistemic rules or rules of etiquette then has 
no intrinsic significance: it does not matter, in and of itself, whether one 
has rational beliefs or not. The significance of following those rules is quite 
unlike, for instance, the significance of finding meaning in one’s life or of 
respecting others. Hence, it is no surprise if general principles like OIC do 
not apply to epistemic obligations (or rules). 
 
I am disinclined to admit this response because I think that at least some 
epistemic statuses, as opposed to statuses of etiquette, bear intrinsic or final 
significance or value. To be fair, some false beliefs seem too negligible to 
matter for their own: whether I truly believe that there is an odd number of 
 
27 See Côté-Bouchard (2017). 
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grains of sand on this beach is negligible. And yet, it seems that in general 
having true beliefs—but not following rules of etiquette—is intrinsically 
or finally significant or valuable. We think it is intrinsically or finally 
valuable to be connected with the world—we want to be guided by the 
truth. And this connection, just is an epistemic connection (see Hyman 
2015, 209). 
 
Now, to be sure, the proposition that knowledge or rationality is finally or 
intrinsically valuable does not entail that following epistemic obligations 
is. But this seems enough to close the gap between ethics and epistemology 
and to widen the gap between epistemology and etiquette. (After all, 
perhaps following moral rules has no intrinsic value. Perhaps it is only 
resulting states of affairs that have intrinsic value.) 
 
We should add that the anti-Epicurean is in no position to insist too much 
on individual cases of valueless knowledge or of true belief. For a similar 
problem will appear in the case of morality. Imagine that we have a pair of 
cases of identical situations of horrible actions except that in the first, but 
not in the second, the villain could not have done otherwise, and so 
infringes no moral obligation. Just like it seems indifferent whether we 
have a true belief or an item of knowledge about the number of grains of 
sands, it seems indifferent whether we are in the first or in the second 
case—whether the villain is infringing an obligation. We should not infer 
from these sorts of cases that there is no real epistemic or moral 
normativity. 
 
It seems, then, that sceptics have a solid case for the symmetry of moral 
and epistemic obligations regarding leeway. This takes us back to the two 
other options, which are costly to the sceptic. Thus, we can say: 
 
Third Lesson: The free will sceptic must either: (1) accept that 
we may have leeway; or (2) reject OIC. 
 
None of these avenues is blocked to the sceptic, but, as we have seen, each 





Epicurus’ argument was prima facie tempting. There seemed to be 
something suspicious about claiming, on the one hand, that we have no 
free will but, on the other hand, engaging into fierce deliberation about 
what would be best and rational for us to achieve and believe. 
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Trying to give the best reading of Epicurus’ argument helped us to identify 
some of the arguments underlying this initial sentiment. There was 
something to it: not just a confused feeling, but sourcehood-related and 
leeway-related arguments concluding that to believe in free will scepticism 
is self-defeating. Yet none of the considered arguments was fully 
successful. That’s a major point in favour of the free will sceptic. 
 
Still, our discussion left the sceptic with three lessons: 
 
First lesson: The free will sceptic cannot and should not rely on 
the doubtful claim that we act because of natural events rather than 
for reasons. 
Second lesson: The free will sceptic must recognise the existence 
of some property of sourcehood, one that is necessary for people 
to believe and act for their own reasons and rationally. 
Third Lesson: The free will sceptic must either: (1) accept that 
we may have leeway; or (2) reject OIC. 
 
These lessons should be added to the sceptic’s breviary. What is their 
significance? The third lesson makes it much harder to be a free will sceptic 
of the leeway kind; and the first lesson deprives the sceptic of an important 
argument (from the exclusion concern). The obvious way forward for free 
will scepticism seems therefore to revolve around the ownership concern, 
according to which we cannot be responsible for our conduct because even 
if we act for our reasons, desires, or values, they are not as much ours (or 
significantly ours) as we thought; in fact, we own them because of factors 
lying outside of our control. This might give confidence to the free will 
sceptics, who have mostly turned to this sort of view in the past decades 
(Strawson 1994; Pereboom 2001; Waller 2011; Pereboom 2014a). Yet 
sourcehood sceptics were mistaken in thinking that since leeway was not 
the crux of responsibility, they could deny the existence of leeway on top 
of sourcehood at no additional cost.28 
 
Although, I did not have the chance to tackle this question seriously (see 
§2.2), I believe it would be a mistake for the sceptic to accept that her 
doctrine is self-defeating and insist that at least she has a true belief. After 
all, what made her view attractive was that she gave us powerful reasons 
to believe that some of our institutions are unjustified and some of our 
attitudes are irrational. To admit that being a sceptic is itself neither 
rational nor reasonable would undermine this. Free will scepticism is a 
philosophical doctrine supported by arguments, not a creed supported by 
hopes. 
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